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By the end of , the WVS had one million members. Pre-war dire predictions of mass air-raid neurosis were not borne out. Predictions had underestimated civilian adaptability and resourcefulness; also there were many new civil defence roles that gave a sense of fighting back rather than despair.
Official histories concluded that the mental health of a nation may have improved, while panic was rare. British air doctrine, since Hugh Trenchard had commanded the Royal Flying Corps — , stressed offence as the best means of defence,  which became known as the cult of the offensive.
To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants.
This philosophy proved impractical, as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment for mass night operations, since resources were diverted to Fighter Command in the mids and it took until to catch up.
Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action and that fighters could not defend Britain alone. The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers.
Many people over 35 remembered the bombing and were afraid of more. From to , German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.
The difficulty of RAF bombers in night navigation and target finding led the British to believe that it would be the same for German bomber crews.
There was also a mentality in all air forces that flying by day would obviate the need for night operations and their inherent disadvantages.
Hugh Dowding , Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command, defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, but preparing day fighter defences left little for night air defence.
When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September , a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.
Dowding was summoned on 17 October, to explain the poor state of the night defences and the supposed but ultimately successful "failure" of his daytime strategy.
The failure to prepare adequate night air defences was undeniable but it was not the responsibility of the AOC Fighter Command to dictate the disposal of resources.
The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in , left few resources for night air defence and the Government, through the Air Ministry and other civil and military institutions was responsible for policy.
Before the war, the Chamberlain government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort.
Because of the inaccuracy of celestial navigation for night navigation and target finding in a fast moving aircraft, the Luftwaffe developed radio navigation devices and relied on three systems: Knickebein Crooked leg , X-Gerät X-Device , and Y-Gerät Y-Device.
This led the British to develop countermeasures, which became known as the Battle of the Beams. Two aerials at ground stations were rotated so that their beams converged over the target.
The German bombers would fly along either beam until they picked up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and dropped their bombs.
Knickebein was in general use but the X-Gerät X apparatus was reserved for specially trained pathfinder crews. X-Gerät receivers were mounted in He s, with a radio mast on the fuselage.
Ground transmitters sent pulses at a rate of per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot visual and aural directions.
Three cross-beams intersected the beam along which the He was flying. The first cross-beam alerted the bomb-aimer, who activated a bombing clock when the second cross-beam was reached.
When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the clock, with the second hand continuing.
When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bombs were released.
Y-Gerät was an automatic beam-tracking system and the most complex of the three devices, which was operated through the autopilot. The pilot flew along an approach beam, monitored by a ground controller.
Signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment, which allowed the distance the bomber had travelled along the beam to be measured precisely.
Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the pilot on course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by a code word from the ground controller or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop.
The maximum range of Y-Gerät was similar to the other systems and it was accurate enough on occasion for specific buildings to be hit. In June , a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein , even though it was under their noses.
Jones , who started a search which discovered that Luftwaffe Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices.
Soon a beam was traced to Derby which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions. The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines.
The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals became known as meaconing using masking beacons meacons.
German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing.
The meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated.
The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder.
The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer. It was to be some months before an effective night-fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets.
Throughout , dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. An unknown number of bombs fell on these diversionary "Starfish" targets.
For industrial areas, fires and lighting were simulated. It was decided to recreate normal residential street lighting, and in non-essential areas, lighting to recreate heavy industrial targets.
In those sites, carbon arc lamps were used to simulate flashes at tram overhead wires. Red lamps were used to simulate blast furnaces and locomotive fireboxes.
Reflections made by factory skylights were created by placing lights under angled wooden panels. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control.
Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires. Another innovation was the boiler fire.
These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C and C Flammbomben.
The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target. The first deliberate air raids on London were mainly aimed at the Port of London , causing severe damage.
Loge continued for 57 nights. Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties.
Some , gross tons of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1, civilians were casualties. Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf s , seven Messerschmitt Bf s and four reconnaissance aircraft.
On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege.
Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough.
Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots. Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city.
Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority.
The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days,  and the second attack failed altogether. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.
While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion as it turned out, indefinitely rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union.
In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters.
But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.
On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around people were killed and another 2, injured.
British anti-aircraft defences General Frederick Alfred Pile fired 8, rounds and shot down only two bombers.
Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged. Loge continued during October. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead.
Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands , again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers.
Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight.
Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch sorties per night including against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X 10th Air Corps which concentrated on mining operations against shipping.
It also took part in the bombing over Britain. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.
Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids.
The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside.
In September, there had been no less than hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5, and 6, wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs.
But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work.
For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale.
More than 13, civilians had been killed, and almost 20, injured, in September and October alone,  but the death toll was much less than expected.
In late , Churchill credited the shelters. Wartime observers perceived the bombing as indiscriminate. American observer Ralph Ingersoll reported the bombing was inaccurate and did not hit targets of military value, but destroyed the surrounding areas.
Ingersol wrote that Battersea Power Station , one of the largest landmarks in London, received only a minor hit.
The British government grew anxious about the delays and disruption of supplies during the month. Reports suggested the attacks blocked the movement of coal to the Greater London regions and urgent repairs were required.
The London Underground rail system was also affected; high explosive bombs damaged the tunnels rendering some unsafe.
British night air defences were in a poor state. Few fighter aircraft were able to operate at night. Ground-based radar was limited, and airborne radar and RAF night fighters were generally ineffective.
The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA or ack-ack in May , with only 2, weapons available.
Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From to , the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant ; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type.
Over several months, the 20, shells spent per raider shot down in September , was reduced to 4, in January and to 2, shells in February Airborne Interception radar AI was unreliable.
The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting.
Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation but to little avail. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties.
Still, in February , there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength.
By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful. The number of contacts and combats rose in , from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January , to and 74 in May sorties.
But even in May, 67 per cent of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43 per cent of the contacts in May were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61 percent of the combats.
Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to one per cent. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance of evading it.
Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be the critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage.
Eventually it would become a success. By 16 February , this had grown to 12; with five equipped, or partially equipped with Beaufighters spread over five Groups.
From November to February , the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities.
The next night, a large force hit Coventry. Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying night sorties.
No follow up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery as Bomber Command would do over Germany from to The concentration had been achieved by accident.
By the end of November, 1, bombers were available for night raids. An average of were able to strike per night. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made.
Probably the most devastating attack occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London.
At , it released the first of 10, fire bombs, eventually amounting to dropped per minute. Not all of the Luftwaffe effort was made against inland cities.
Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January, Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily.
On 17 January around bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32, in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas.
Four days later tons was dropped including 60, incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40, incendiaries.
Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched.
Seven major and eight heavy attacks were flown, but the weather made it difficult to keep up the pressure. Still, at Southampton , attacks were so effective morale did give way briefly with civilian authorities leading people en masse out of the city.
Although official German air doctrine did target civilian morale, it did not espouse the attacking of civilians directly.
It hoped to destroy morale by destroying the enemy's factories and public utilities as well as its food stocks by attacking shipping.
Nevertheless, its official opposition to attacks on civilians became an increasingly moot point when large-scale raids were conducted in November and December Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing.
Locating targets in skies obscured by industrial haze meant the target area needed to be illuminated and hit "without regard for the civilian population".
The tactic was expanded into Feuerleitung Blaze Control with the creation of Brandbombenfelder Incendiary Fields to mark targets. These were marked out by parachute flares.
These decisions, apparently taken at the Luftflotte or Fliegerkorps level, meant attacks on individual targets were gradually replaced by what was, for all intents and purposes, an unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff Terror Attack.
The effectiveness of British countermeasures against Knickebein , which was designed to avoid area attacks, forced the Luftwaffe to resort to these methods.
KGr increased its use of incendiaries from 13 to 28 percent. By December, this had increased to 92 percent.
Other units ceased using parachute flares and opted for explosive target markers. In , the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder —commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine —had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force U-Bootwaffe in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports.
This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets. Hitler's interest in this strategy forced Göring and Jeschonnek to review the air war against Britain in January This led to Göring and Jeschonnek agreeing to Hitler's Directive 23, Directions for operations against the British War Economy , which was published on 6 February and gave aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority.
Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain.
Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units.
Göring's lack of co-operation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain.
Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik Flying Command Atlantic on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys.
He was always reluctant to co-operate with Raeder. Even so, the decision by the OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine.
First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led the OKL to adopt the naval option.
They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives.
Other targets would be considered if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions. A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for However, meteorological conditions over Britain were not favourable for flying and prevented an escalation in air operations.
Airfields became water-logged and the 18 Kampfgruppen bomber groups of the Luftwaffe ' s Kampfgeschwadern bomber wings were relocated to Germany for rest and re-equipment.
From the German point of view, March saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4, sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks.
The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets.
Auf einer Bank in einem kleinen Park beraten sich die beiden. Johnnys Frau Hetty ist wenig begeistert von den Überraschungsgästen.
Er eröffne dort einen englischen Pub, da könnten beide arbeiten. Es gelingt Blaney Babs zu überreden, es zusammen in Paris zu versuchen.
Sie verabreden sich für den nächsten Tag am Bahnhof. Babs geht zu ihrer Arbeitsstelle. Der Wirt, der von den Gerüchten gehört hat, kündigt auch ihr und wirft sie aus ihrem Zimmer.
Als sie aus dem Pub stürmt, trifft sie Bob Rusk. Er bietet ihr an, dass sie erst einmal in seiner Wohnung bleiben könne, da er abwesend sei.
In der folgenden Nacht bringt Rusk mit einer Karre heimlich einen schweren Sack zu einem Lkw, der Kartoffeln geladen hat.
In dem Sack befindet sich die Leiche von Babs, die Rusk ebenfalls erwürgt hat. Er versteckt sie zwischen den gefüllten Jutesäcken. Als er wieder in seinem Apartment ist, bemerkt er, dass seine Krawattennadel fehlt, die durch das diamantbesetzte Emblem auf seine Spur führen könnte.
Sie muss sich in der Hand der Leiche befinden. Verzweifelt versucht er, auf der Ladefläche des Lkw den richtigen Sack zu finden, als sich der Lkw in Bewegung setzt.
Als Rusk endlich das Gesuchte gefunden hat, muss er dem Opfer die starren Finger brechen, um an die Nadel zu kommen.
Bei einem Halt an einer Raststätte springt er vom Wagen. Der Lkw fährt später weiter, verliert aber nun Teile seiner Ladung, da die Bordwand heruntergeklappt ist.
Als die Ermordung von Babs bekannt wird, kommt es zwischen Blaney und seinem ehemaligen Fliegerkameraden zu einem Streit.
Dieser könnte ihm ein Alibi geben, unterlässt dies aber, da seine Frau nicht in Schwierigkeiten geraten möchte.
Nunmehr als Mörder gesucht, schleicht sich Blaney zu Rusk, der ihm eine Zuflucht anbietet. In Wahrheit will Rusk seine Verbrechen Blaney anlasten.
Denn kurz darauf trifft die von ihm benachrichtigte Polizei ein und nimmt Blaney fest. In dessen Tasche finden sich die Kleider der ermordeten Babs, die Rusk dort versteckt hat.
Verzweifelt beteuert Blaney im Gerichtssaal seine Unschuld. Als er zu einer lebenslangen Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt wird, schwört er Rusk Rache.
Blaney stürzt sich bewusst im Gefängnis eine Treppe hinunter und trägt eine blutende Wunde davon, worauf er in eine schlecht bewachte Krankenstation kommt.
Mancini had to pay all transportation and accommodations himself. In his autobiography, Mancini reports that the discussions between himself and Hitchcock seemed clear, and he thought he understood what was wanted; but he was replaced and flew back home to Hollywood.
The irony was that Mancini was being second-guessed for being too dark and symphonic after having been criticized for being too light before.
Mancini's experience with Frenzy was a painful topic for the composer for years to come. Hitchcock then hired composer Ron Goodwin to write the score after being impressed with some of his earlier work.
He had Goodwin rescore the opening titles in the style of a London travelogue - the director had heard his score for the Peter Sellers sketch Balham, Gateway to the South.
Frenzy received positive reviews from critics. Vincent Canby of [he New York Times called it "a passionately entertaining film" with "a marvelously funny script" and a "superb" cast.
This is the kind of thriller Hitchcock was making in the s, filled with macabre details, incongruous humor, and the desperation of a man convicted of a crime he didn't commit.
Some reviews were more mixed. Gary Arnold of The Washington Post wrote that the film "has a promising opening sequence and a witty curtain line, but the material in between is decidedly pedestrian.
The reviewers who've been hailing 'Frenzy' as a new classic and the triumphant return of the master of suspense are, to put it kindly, exaggerating the occasion If this picture had been made by anyone else, it would be described, justly, as a mildly diverting attempt to imitate Hitchcock.
The critical consensus reads: "Marking Alfred Hitchcock's return to England and first foray into viscerally explicit carnage, Frenzy finds the master of horror regaining his grip on the audience's pulse -- and making their blood run cold.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For other uses, see Frenzy disambiguation. Theatrical release poster. Release date. Running time. Rusk uncredited Michael Sheard as Jim, Rusk's friend in pub uncredited.
The Numbers. Retrieved 22 May Hitchcock and Adaptation: On the Page and Screen. Retrieved 30 January Retrieved 17 April Appel, Alfred, Jr.
Film Comment; New York Vol. Los Angeles Times , 2 June f1. By Guy Flatley. Murphy, Mary. Los Angeles Times , 24 July a7. Issue Lurot Brand.
Published winter Retrieved 13 September Regan Books. Retrieved 23 May The Guardian , 29 December 9. The Guardian. Retrieved 6 March The New York Times : The New York Times : D1.
Variety : 6. Retrieved 30 July The New Yorker : Los Angeles Times. Calendar, p. The Washington Post. The Monthly Film Bulletin.